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LIBERTY’S LIMITS & EDITING HUMANITY *
ALEXANDRA L. FOULKES **
Any debate about the effects of Lawrence v. Texas on American society
notwithstanding, the Court’s opinion is a landmark in its own right. Lawrence’s
logic placed an indelible mark on the Constitution’s central—though certainly
elusive—protections of liberty. Particularly after Lawrence, substantive due
process might amount to something beyond the sum of its parts. By defining
liberty not merely as a collection of disconnected rights, but as a larger whole,
Lawrence invites a more flexible substantive due process analysis. The
foreseeable consequence of this flexible approach in fact manifested. Justice
Scalia’s vision of Lawrence—that the decision would lead to a flood of litigation
in the lower courts—materialized, at least to some extent, with litigants
advocating for the recognition of new fundamental rights. But even Justice
Scalia would never have included in his parade of horribles the most recent effort
to expand liberty’s definition: a call for the recognition of a fundamental right to
edit humanity. The argument for a fundamental right to edit humanity stems
from the Court’s jurisprudence on procreative, parental, and privacy rights. The
flexible language in Lawrence, too, lends its support. This Article asserts that a
fundamental right to edit humanity should not be recognized. While not
necessarily inconsistent with precedent, the arguments for the right to engage in
therapeutic germline genome editing do not flow naturally from the Court’s
previous holdings. Further, entitling parents to use GGE also poses
insurmountable practical and policy-based obstacles. Most poignantly, the linedrawing method that has been proposed will prove intractable. And, in any case,
our legislative and executive branches of government are far better positioned to
handle the issues raised by germline genome editing than the courts.
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INTRODUCTION
In his article, Editing Humanity, Dr. Paul Enríquez makes an important
contribution to a long line of scholarship on the constitutional implications of
reproductive technologies. 1 Enríquez’s piece is the first to deal with the
1. See Paul Enríquez, Editing Humanity: On the Precise Manipulation of DNA in Human Embryos,
97 N.C. L. REV. 1147 (2019). Enríquez is not the first to look to the constitutional implications of these
technologies. See, e.g., John B. Attanasio, The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering:
Where Procreative Liberty and Equal Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274, 1285–91 (1986) (laying
out arguments for and against a fundamental right to genetic engineering of positive traits or
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development of CRISPR-Cas9 technologies in this context. Through CRISPR,
previously impossible feats in genetic engineering have become imminent
realities. 2 Chinese scientists have successfully modified the genomes of human
embryos—repeatedly. 3 These ventures into germline genome editing (“GGE”),
coupled with ominous lessons from history and significant gaps in our
understanding of the safety of CRISPR applications, have spurred protective
legislation. In fact, Enríquez argues that current legislative and administrative
regulations in the United States form a de facto legal ban on GGE clinical
applications. 4 And he suggests that this ban amounts to an unconstitutional
intrusion on individual liberties. 5 Enríquez argues for the existence of a
fundamental right that extends to protect the parent’s decision to edit out
certain genetic conditions in her offspring.
In response to Enríquez, I argue that a fundamental right to edit humanity
should not be recognized. While not necessarily inconsistent with precedent,
the arguments for the right to engage in therapeutic GGE don’t flow naturally
from the United States Supreme Court’s previous holdings. In addition to
doctrinal questions about the scope of fundamental rights, entitling parents to
use GGE also poses practical and policy-based obstacles.
Part I of this Article begins with a layout of the relevant constitutional
doctrine and Enríquez’s argument before further developing the argument for
a fundamental right to GGE. Part II addresses the weaknesses in the argument
for a fundamental right to GGE. Finally, Part III turns to policy-based
arguments against recognizing the right.
I. PROPOSED ARGUMENTS AND FRAMEWORK FOR GGE AS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments promise refuge from
government-sanctioned deprivations of “life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” 6 Exactly what constitutes an invasion of liberty as protected by
the Due Process Clause, however, isn’t so clear.

enhancements). But as Professor Attanasio noted, in grappling with these issues “individual genetic
breakthroughs must be examined on their own merits.” Id. at 1342.
2. CRISPR stands for Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats. For an
explanation of the science, see Alexandra L. Foulkes et al., Legal and Ethical Implications of CRISPR
Applications in Psychiatry, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1359, 1363–65 (2019).
3. David Cyranoski & Sara Reardon, Chinese Scientists Genetically Modify Human Embryos,
NATURE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.nature.com/news/chinese-scientists-genetically-modifyhuman-embryos-1.17378 [https://perma.cc/CYG4-QC8F].
4. See Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1162.
5. Id. at 1240.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
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Attempts To Establish GGE as a Fundamental Right

The precise contours of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
are not subject to being “reduced to any formula.” 7 The Court’s existing privacy
jurisprudence, however, provides guideposts for understanding GGE as a
fundamental right.
1. Doctrinal Foundation: Family, Reproduction, and Parental Choices
Meyer v. Nebraska 8 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters 9 are perhaps the two
sturdiest guideposts, foundational to a modern understanding of substantive
due process doctrine. 10 The Court in these cases was concerned with protecting
a parent’s authority to make basic choices about her children’s upbringing. 11 To
be sure, the issues in both Meyer and Pierce are narrow. In Meyer, the Court held
that a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of certain languages in public
schools was unconstitutional, unreasonably depriving parents of liberty without
due process of law. 12 Similarly, in Pierce, the Court found that the statecompelled attendance of children at public schools unreasonably interfered with
a parent’s interests in directing the rearing of her offspring. 13 Despite their
narrow holdings, the language in these decisions included broad statements
about liberty’s substantive reach. 14 The Court has subsequently declined to
describe the rights that Meyer and Pierce protect as discrete, enumerable private
activities. 15 Rather, what these precedents establish is how certain parenting
decisions fall along the continuum of moral choice and personal autonomy
central to the constitutionally protected realm of liberty. 16

7. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see Andrew B. Coan, Is There
a Constitutional Right To Select the Genes of One’s Offspring?, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 238 (2011) (“[T]he
scope of the constitutional right to procreative liberty and the extent of its application to geneticselection decisions is, in a nutshell, unclear.”).
8. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
9. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
10. See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1934 (2004).
11. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399–400 (1923).
12. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400.
13. See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535.
14. See id. at 534–35; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
15. See Tribe, supra note 10, at 1934–35.
16. See Joshua D. Hawley, The Intellectual Origins of (Modern) Substantive Due Process, 93 TEX. L.
REV. 275, 277 (2014). Meyer and Pierce are Supreme Court decisions handed down during the infamous
Lochner era. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 516 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
reasoning stated in Meyer and Pierce was the same natural law due process philosophy which many later
opinions repudiated.”).
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The Court’s later decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut 17 and Eisenstadt v.
Baird 18 bring this point into focus. In Griswold, the Court invalidated a state law
that barred the distribution and use of contraceptives. 19 Eisenstadt extended the
holding in Griswold beyond the marital relationship. 20 Both opinions describe
the identified right as “the right of privacy” 21 and conclude that “it is the right
of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as to the decision whether to beget
a child.” 22
Griswold and Eisenstadt formed the background against which Roe v.
Wade 23 was decided. In Roe, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
Texas statute prohibiting abortion. 24 Roe revalidated the existence of a
fundamental right to privacy. 25 It held that this right is implicated when a
woman decides whether to obtain an abortion because becoming a mother may
place a heavy burden on the woman. 26 And given that carrying an unintended
or unwanted pregnancy to term might pose severe and imminent harm to the
individual decisionmaker, the state’s ability to restrict her decisionmaking
capacity in this context should be limited. 27
Importantly, however, the Court in Roe emphasized that the woman’s
right is not absolute. 28 This understanding of Roe’s holding was later bolstered
by Carey v. Population Services International, 29 where the Court struck down a
law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to minors by relying on
Griswold’s and Eisenstadt’s logic. 30 In Carey, the Court explained that an aspect
of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included the guarantee
of certain zones of privacy, encompassing the “interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions.” 31 The Court was concerned with
guarding decisionmaking autonomy in personal choices “relating to marriage,
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
18. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
19. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
20. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
21. Id.; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
22. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
24. Id. at 117–18.
25. Id. at 152.
26. Id. at 152–53.
27. Id. at 153.
28. Id.
29. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
30. Id. at 685.
31. Carey v. Population Serv. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852–53 (1992) (stating that Eisenstadt, Griswold, and Carey “involve personal
decisions concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human responsibility and respect
for it”).
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procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education” because the consequences of these decisions so fundamentally affect
a person. 32
Finally, through Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas, 33 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Texas law criminalizing
homosexual sodomy. 34 The focus of the inquiry in Lawrence was not—as it had
been in Bowers v. Hardwick 35—whether the petitioners had a fundamental right
to engage in homosexual sodomy. 36 Rather, the Court looked to how the state
had chosen to apportion decisionmaking roles in the context at hand. The Court
assessed the allocations’ constitutionality, looking to how, through these
divisions, the state had involved itself in the petitioners’ choices on the
relationships they sought to form or the people they wanted to be. 37
2. Applying the Doctrine to GGE for Therapeutic Uses
a.

The Argument for GGE in the CRISPR Context

Enríquez’s argument focuses on a narrow category of applications: the use
of GGE for health and therapeutic purposes. 38 Enríquez argues that a person’s
decision whether to become a parent is likely to be affected by the knowledge
that she is a carrier of a genetic mutation for a serious genetic disease. 39 And,
certainly, the Supreme Court has noted that “[i]f the right to privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual . . . to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into the matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” 40 If the parent is left to choose
between no child and a child destined to live a life of disease, likely to end in
premature death, then the recognized right to procreate might be undermined. 41
The congenital disease of a child may impose on his mother a “distressful life
and future.” 42 Just as Roe recognized, “Psychological harm may be imminent,
[and the parent’s] mental and physical health may be taxed by childcare.” 43
32. Carey, 431 U.S. at 684–85 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53 (1973)).
33. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
34. Id. at 578.
35. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
36. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566. In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court considered the constitutionality
of a Georgia sodomy law, neutral on its face, and upheld the law finding no constitutional violations.
Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 186, 196 (1986).
37. See Tribe, supra note 10, at 1931.
38. See Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1226.
39. Id.
40. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis added); see also Enríquez, supra note
1, at 1220–21.
41. Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1221 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942)).
42. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
43. Enríquez. supra note 1, at 1221. (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).
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Enríquez identifies many of the important connections. Though, it is worth
considering how the argument for GGE can be strengthened before assessing
whether it is sufficiently convincing.
b.

Strengthening the Argument for GGE

Roe deserves more attention because, in the GGE context, like in Roe, the
centrality of the parent’s decision is key. The decision to edit out disease in her
child is central to her parental autonomy and, as such, points beyond superficial
connections to the discrete, property-like rights identified in Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 44 Eisenstadt, and Roe—relics reminiscent of the Lochner area. 45 It’s not
that a new right to use GGE for therapeutic purposes should be listed after the
right to procreate, 46 or the right of a pregnant woman to terminate a
pregnancy, 47 in a catalogue of “unenumerated” liberties. Rather, it is arguable
that the same thread that connected Lawrence to Casey, to Roe, to Griswold, and
the rest reaches the decision of a parent to use GGE to remedy a child’s serious
genetic condition. That is, the idea that the fundamental right to privacy
protects decisions impacting the parent’s choice to form the relationships she
wants to form or be the person she wants to be. The right at issue is the right
to privacy, against government interference, to make decisions central to
personal autonomy—namely the decision to edit out genetic defect in an
offspring.
i. The Decision to Engage in GGE & Relationships
The relationship between a parent and child is one through which a parent
develops a part of herself. 48 Unlike a marital relationship, the parent-child
relationship is timeless and often becomes more life-altering than marriage. 49
Hence, the right to privacy, affording protection to the individual to marry
without race- or sex-based restrictions, 50 might imply some right to enter into a
parent-child relationship unencumbered by burdensome genetic conditions. 51
The Court has recognized how controlling the formation of children is
central to parental autonomy. 52 It’s clear that the choice to have one’s children

44. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
45. See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text.
46. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536.
47. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
48. See MIRIAM GALPER COHEN, LONG-DISTANCE PARENTING 21 (1989) (“Without that
connection, both parents and children fail to develop a part of themselves.”).
49. Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1223.
50. The decision to marry is constitutionally protected, at least to some extent. See Obergefell v.
Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
51. See Jason C. Glahn, I Teach You the Superman: Why Congress Cannot Constitutionally Prohibit
Genetic Modification, 25 WHITTIER L. REV. 409, 427 (2003).
52. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923).
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learn German is central enough to the formation of parental autonomy to
deserve constitutional protection. 53 So is the decision to have one’s child attend
private school. 54 As such, the centrality of a decision to rid one’s child of serious
genetic disease arguably follows a fortiori. The consequences of the latter for
the responsible parent are far more severe: the burden placed on a parent as a
result of having a diseased child is arguably far greater than the burden of having
a child who doesn’t speak German. And Roe teaches us that the weight of this
burden—the imminent psychological harms and physical tax on the parent—is
instructive as to the centrality of the parent’s decision. 55
ii. Conceptualizing the Parent’s Harm: Wrongful Birth Claims
Wrongful birth claims, which are rare but recognized in a number of
jurisdictions, 56 conceptualize a child’s genetic disease as the parent’s injury. 57
These claims arise when a parent sues a medical professional arguing that
genetic defects, negligently undetected by the diagnostician, manifested in her
child. 58 As such, the parent was deprived of the legal opportunity to terminate
the pregnancy. 59 The woman can then sue for damages for pain and suffering,
the cost of the child’s treatment, and other related expenses. 60 These cases
demonstrate that the harm springing from a genetically “defective” child
accrues to the mother. It’s the loss of her constitutionally guaranteed right to
make decisions central to the formation of familial relationships.
iii. The (Nonexistent) Child’s (Nonexistence) Harm
On the other hand, wrongful life claims are generally barred. Here, the
child with the genetic condition sues, arguing he never should have been born. 61
Most courts justify their refusal to recognize wrongful life claims by noting how
53. Id.
54. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
56. See Mark Strasser, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the Right To Refuse
Treatment: Can Reasonable Jurisdictions Recognize All But One, 64 MO. L. REV. 29, 30 (1999).
57. Mara C. Bottis, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 11 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 55, 55 (2004).
58. See Strasser, supra note 56, at 30.
59. See, e.g., Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Iowa 2017)
(recognizing that a mother and father had cognizable cause of action for child’s wrongful birth).
60. Id. at 399–403 (noting that “a majority of states recognize wrongful-birth claims [and] [a]t
least twenty-three states recognize the claim by judicial decision,” and describing the compensable
injury to the parent); see Wuth v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 359 P.3d 841, 853 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015); see
also Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1115 (Md. 2002) (“[T]he parents of the child could sue the
doctor for the expense of raising the unplanned child during her minority, reduced by the value of the
benefits conferred to them by having the child.” (citing Jones v. Malinowski, 473 A.2d 429, 435 (Md.
1984))).
61. It seems all but two jurisdictions, New Jersey and Washington, have rejected these claims. See
Geler v. Akawie, 818 A.2d 402, 403 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc.,
656 P.2d 483, 486 (Wash. 1983).
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impossible it is to conceptualize the claimant’s harm: “The infant plaintiff
would have us measure the difference between his life with defects against the
utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such a determination.” 62
Implicitly, a majority of courts have recognized that the “Nonidentity Problem”
limits wrongful life claims. 63
The Nonidentity Problem posits that it’s wrong to say that a child has
been harmed by being brought into existence, so long as that child has been
given a life worth living. 64 A life not worth living is a life so devoid of anything
good, and so filled with suffering, that the individual would be better off never
to have existed at all. 65 The Nonidentity Problem reinforces the
conceptualization of the harm generated by the birth of a genetically defective
child as the parent’s harm alone.
iv. A Negative Right, Deeply Rooted in History
To recognize a fundamental right to GGE, one need not rely on “abstract
concepts of personal autonomy,” 66 at least no more abstract than those concepts
already deemed worthy of protection by the Court. If we accept what has been
laid out above, it follows that there already exists a concrete right to privacy
deeply rooted in our nation’s history that extends to cover the decision to edit
a child’s genome.
The right can be conceptualized as a right against unwanted intrusion as
opposed to a positive claim to access. 67 The claim is in the negative: to keep the
government from usurping a parent’s decisionmaking authority on matters so
central to the development of the parent-child relationship, and hence to the
development of the parent’s self. In the context of relationships, to act privately
is not to act in isolation. Rather it is to act autonomously, free from government
interference. 68
B.

The Proposed Policy Framework for Future GGE

Enríquez’s constitutional claim for a fundamental right to engage in
selective uses of GGE is a narrow one. Enríquez proposes a legal- and sciencebased normative framework, in an attempt to draw clean lines that distinguish
62. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967).
63. I. Glenn Cohen, Beyond Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1187, 1213 (2012) [hereinafter Cohen,
Best Interests].
64. Id. at 1208.
65. Id.
66. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 703 (1997) (noting that when recognizing a right
deeply rooted in our nation’s history the Court will not rely on “abstract concepts of personal
autonomy”).
67. Tandice Ossareh, Note, Would You Like Blue Eyes with That? A Fundamental Right to Genetic
Modification of Embryos, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 729, 757 (2017).
68. Id. at 758.
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between permissible and impermissible GGE applications. 69 He identifies four
distinct purposes for which parents might want to use GGE: (1) health and
therapeutic uses to remedy disease; (2) prophylactic purposes, only some of
which may be therapeutic in nature; (3) cosmetic or enhancement purposes; and
(4) modification of special traits for which the law affords certain protections. 70
Enríquez claims editing in the first category is a fundamental right. 71
Category 1 interventions, according to Enríquez, target only monogenic
diseases—generally life-long and debilitating conditions for which the science
is well understood. 72 Conversely, Enríquez asserts that uses that fall into the
fourth category are constitutionally prohibited, as they create a likelihood of
discrimination against specific groups. Enríquez acknowledges that Category 4
interventions are unlikely to be real clinical possibilities soon. 73
Enríquez recognizes that distinguishing between the first and second
categories poses a challenge. As he acknowledges, prophylactic interventions, or
Category 2 uses, share a lot of characteristics with Category 1 interventions, and
the precise point at which disease or disability begins is hard to define. 74
Enríquez’s argument seeks to avoid this line-drawing problem by limiting
Category 1—and thus constitutional protections—to mostly monogenic diseases
and not polygenic conditions. 75 Enriquez chooses to draw the line between
Category 1 and Category 2 at monogenic and polygenic because CRISPR’s most
attractive therapeutic targets at this time are monogenic conditions. 76
But drawing the line at monogenic/polygenic, however, seems irrelevant
to the fundamental rights analysis. The distinction may certainly be key to an
analysis of the government’s interest in regulating GGE, as Enríquez indicates.
The government’s interest in regulating GGE might shift over time as science
understands more clearly how to apply GGE to polygenic conditions. But if
there is a fundamental right to use GGE on one’s children to remedy disease, it
seems arbitrary for the existence of the right to turn on how well experts
understand the science of certain conditions today. It is the decision to engage
in GGE to remedy disease—independent of the disease’s genetic profile—that
leads to consequences so fundamentally affecting a person that government
interference shouldn’t be tolerated. This is so even if the definition of disease
might change over time. There is precedent in Roe showing how using
technology as a benchmark might turn out to be a bad idea: “The Roe
69. Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1219.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1219–20.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1235.
74. Id. at 1226.
75. See id. at 1220.
76. Id. at 1220 n.398. Monogenic conditions involve or control a single gene. Polygenic conditions
involve more than one gene. Id. at 1220 nn.396–97.
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framework, then, is clearly on a collision course with itself. As medical science
becomes better able to provide for the separate existence of the fetus, the point
of viability is moved further back toward conception.” 77
I argue that the framework for deciding when a government’s interest
might be strong enough to survive strict scrutiny cannot be relevant to the
analysis of whether the right exists in the first place. Below, I’ll show that the
available jurisprudence does not support finding a fundamental right in this
context, at all.
II. BEYOND LIBERTY’S REACH: A COUNTERARGUMENT TO GGE AS A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
The argument for GGE relies on an expansive reading of the Court’s
jurisprudence. 78 The Court’s opinion in Lawrence certainly left open the
possibility of conceptualizing liberty as the regression line that explains all of
the data points plotted by the Court in Meyer, Pierce, Roe, and the rest. But
Lawrence drew no such line. The Court in Lawrence recognized no new
fundamental right, nor did the Court explicitly recognize that the decisions at
issue in Lawrence fell within the protected privacy sphere. 79
Such a broad understanding of the Constitution’s guarantees is in tension
with the Court’s own statements warning that its line of substantive due process
cases won’t justify a “sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate,
and personal decisions are so protected.” 80 To understand which decisions fit
the modern substantive due process trend, there must be some limiting
principle beyond the fact that the decision at issue is of the same kind as those
involved in earlier fundamental rights cases. This section will turn first to
Glucksberg and then to Lawrence in search of possible limitations. I will then
consider competing interests implicated in the Court’s decisions on parental
autonomy as a limiting principle, suggesting that a right to use GGE for
therapeutic purposes likely falls outside of liberty’s substantive reach.
A.

Doctrinal Deficiencies: Glucksberg’s and Lawrence’s Limitations

Certainly, the argument in Part II above has identified the necessary
prerequisite that fundamental decisions be intimate, personal, and of central
importance. And the argument for GGE shows that the necessary prerequisite

77. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 458 (1983) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abrogating Roe’s
trimester system based on the viability of the child).
78. See Ossareh, supra note 67, at 730.
79. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). The Court decided the case by stating that
Texas failed to meet the requirements of rational basis scrutiny. Id.
80. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 727 (1997).
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has been met. But the argument fails to account for the likelihood that this
condition, while necessary, is not sufficient.
1. A Right Too Broad with Roots Too Shallow
Perhaps the relevant limiting principle can be found in Washington v.
Glucksberg, where the Court unanimously identified two constraints for
recognizing fundamental rights. 81 To avoid having to recognize the broadly
framed “right to die,” which might have been easily transmuted into a right
encompassing a slew of choices about how and when to end one’s life, 82
Glucksberg required that: (1) the right asserted be deeply rooted in the nation’s
history and that (2) it be carefully defined. 83 This was so despite the fact that
the issue in Glucksberg shared underlying commonalities with the Court’s
substantive due process precedent in Roe and the rest. The decision, after all,
involved control over one’s own bodily integrity. 84 In other words, Glucksberg
recognized that although the choice at issue was, in one sense, of the same kind
as those that the Court had recognized as fundamental, that alone was not
enough to guarantee constitutional protection.
a.

Overbroad, Subjective, and Discretionary

The argument for recognizing therapeutic GGE as a fundamental right
claims that there is a deeply rooted history for the right to privacy to make
decisions central to personal autonomy, and that the decision to edit out genetic
defects in an offspring is then encompassed by that right to privacy. 85
Glucksberg’s first prong is thereby met by virtue of the fact that the deep
historical roots that existed to support Meyer then grew deeper as the Court
decided Pierce, Griswold, Roe, and Casey. But framing the right broadly as the
right to privacy (against government interference) to make decisions central to
personal autonomy, namely the decision to edit out genetic defects in an
offspring, leads to intractable line drawing.
The right to use GGE is primarily rooted in the burden that’s placed on
the parent by virtue of giving birth to a “diseased” child or by having to risk
conceiving a “diseased” child. 86 The weight of this burden, as Roe instructs, is
what makes the decision to use GGE central to parental autonomy. That weight
might be subjective, as it appears to be conceptualized in Roe: this particular
81. Id. at 719.
82. Id. at 709.
83. See id. at 720–21. I’ll refer to these two limitations as Glucksberg’s first and second prongs
respectively.
84. Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1517, 1528 (2008).
85. See supra notes 38–47 and accompanying text.
86. I’m using scare quotes here to emphasize that the term “diseased,” like the term “normal,” is
loaded. Cohen, Best Interests, supra note 63, at 1226.
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woman, in her individual circumstances, might be so physically burdened by
becoming a mother that the weight of the burden becomes intolerable. 87 If so,
whether a condition is monogenic or polygenic—or, for that matter, whether
the GGE is targeted at treatment or enhancement—would be irrelevant. The
question becomes whether having a particular child would place such a burden
on the mother so as to make the GGE decision central and thereby so
fundamentally important as to warrant staving off government interference. 88
The line drawn at genetic disease in the argument above becomes unworkable.
For example, let’s imagine a mother with achondroplasia who wants her
child to share in her experience. 89 Her partner also has achondroplasia, and so,
without intervention, their chances of having a child without achondroplasia are
25%. 90 For her, that’s too risky. The mother’s house, vehicle, and workplace
have been modified to accommodate her different capacities. And living with
achondroplasia has shaped a significant part of her identity. To her, having a
child without achondroplasia would be physically and emotionally burdensome.
She feels ill-equipped to raise a person without achondroplasia. The mother
can’t bear the thought of never having a child with achondroplasia with whom
to share her experience. Ultimately, without having raised such a child, she’ll
fail to develop a part of herself. According to the argument for GGE above, this
mother’s access to the technology should be constitutionally protected, even
though society will view her child with achondroplasia as “diseased.” 91
What if the burden is a more objective one, as Enríquez proposes, limiting
the use of GGE for conditions society considers to be genetic diseases at the
time of intervention? Then, there’s an overbreadth problem, both because at
one point in time society may view a condition as a disability and later come to
see that same expression as diversity, and also because at any given point in
time it may be hard to determine exactly what conditions society considers
burdensome. This ambiguity all derives from the fact that the line between
diversity and disability simply is not clear. 92
We can begin our discussion on society’s inability to cleanly differentiate
between disability and disease with Fragile X syndrome. Fragile X syndrome,
87. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
88. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text; see also Elyse W. Gant, Note, Assessing the
Constitutionality of Reproductive Technologies Regulation: A Bioethical Approach, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 997,
1009 (2010).
89. This illustration isn’t much of a hypothetical. See ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE
TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 149 (2012). People with
achondroplasia are also known as “little people.” Frequently Asked Questions, LITTLE PEOPLE AM.,
https://www.lpaonline.org/faq-#Gene [https://perma.cc/Q23A-VTPX].
90. The genetics and inheritance patterns of achondroplasia are relatively well understood.
Learning About Achondroplasia, NAT’L. HUM. GENOME RES. INST. https://www.genome.gov/
19517823/learning-about-achondroplasia/ [https://perma.cc/GFA8-QGSB].
91. Id.
92. See Foulkes et al., supra note 2, at 1396.

98 N.C. L. REV. F. 1549 (2020)

1562

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98

which is a monogenic condition likely to be a target of CRISPR intervention in
the near future, 93 is thought to be the most commonly inherited form of
intellectual disability. 94 Fragile X causes developmental abnormalities in the
brain that are thought to lead to severe autism-like symptoms. 95 But those
diagnosed with Fragile X may go on to form meaningful relationships and live
fruitful lives. 96 And some have claimed that neurodiversity, or the idea that
certain “cognitive impairments” are a part of the normal spectrum of diversity,
should extend to include autism-like symptoms. 97
Though we may not understand the genetic architecture of sexuality well
enough to make it a target of CRISPR intervention today, 98 sexuality
nevertheless serves as a poignant reminder of how the line between disease and
disability is fluid. Its history serves as a cautionary tale for how unregulated
uses of GGE might not be a good idea, even if they are limited to what—in this
moment in time—society considers therapeutic uses. I acknowledge that
Enríquez proposes that this category should be protected. 99 But my point is that
not too long ago, a parent would have considered a homosexual child to be
“diseased.” It was not until 1992 that the World Health Organization stopped
classifying homosexuality as a disease. 100 And to date, the American Psychiatric
Association categorizes gender dysphoria as a disease, the treatment of which—
in some cases—comes to requires serious medical intervention. 101 Gender
dysphoria and homosexuality are both linked disproportionately to premature
death. 102
93. Id. at 1376.
94. X. Shawn Liu et al., Rescue of Fragile X Syndrome Neurons by DNA Methylation Editing of the
FMR1 Gene, 172 CELL 979, 979 (2018).
95. Dejan B. Budimirovic, Fragile X Syndrome and Autism Spectrum Disorder: The Similarities and
Differences Between FXS and ASD, NAT’L FRAGILE X FOUND., (Dec. 18, 2014)
https://fragilex.org/support-and-resources/fragile-x-syndrome-and-autism-spectrum-disordersimilarities-and-differences/ [https://perma.cc/9YPJ-QDEJ].
96. See Real Stories from People Living with Fragile X Syndrome, CDC (May 30, 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fxs/stories.html [https://perma.cc/2BKS-BNNV].
97. See SOLOMON, supra note 89, at 275.
98. See generally A. Ganna et al., Large-Scale GWAS Reveals Insight into the Genetic Architecture of
Same-Sex Sexual Behavior, 365 SCI. eeat7693 (Sept. 4, 2019) (explaining how two studies have
“indicated that same-sex sexual behavior has a genetic component”).
99. Enríquez, supra note 1, at 1235.
100. Neel Burton, When Homosexuality Stopped Being a Mental Disorder, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept.
18, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/hide-and-seek/201509/when-homosexualitystopped-being-mental-disorder [https://perma.cc/N9XG-KQFA].
101. Ranna Parekh, What Is Gender Dysphoria?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Feb. 2016),
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria
[https://perma.cc/HWC3-D69X].
102. See Geoffrey L. Ream, What’s Unique About Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT)
Youth and Young Adult Suicides? Findings from the National Violent Death Reporting System, 64 J.
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 602, 602 (2019). I am mindful of the fact that, statistics aside, suggesting that
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Another interesting example is that of the Belgian town of Geel, which
has been embracing strangers with severe mental illness for over 700 years. 103
In Geel, those with psychiatric disorders are not treated or medicated; they are
called guests or boarders, as opposed to patients. 104 The eccentric behaviors of
the guests are incorporated into society without fear or emotion. 105 The Geel
case study suggests that the label of “disease” is largely a social construct. 106 In
Geel, boarders become a part of society and life, such that any distinction
between the boarders and nonboarders has blurred. 107 Ultimately, Fragile X,
Geel, and homosexuality are a few examples among many. 108 The attitudes of
society shift over time as data is gathered and synthesized, and it is possible that
what society considers a disease today may not be classified as such in the future.
b.

Narrowing the Right

As Enríquez notes, the line-drawing problem could arguably be solved by
more carefully defining the right, as Glucksberg’s second prong requires. After
all, conditions such as Tay-Sachs and Lesch-Nyhan syndrome are unlikely ever
to be considered a part of the normal spectrum of diversity. At approximately
six months of age, infants diagnosed with Lesch-Nyhan syndrome begin
deteriorating neurologically and physiologically. These infants display severe
mental deficiencies and compulsive self-mutilation behaviors. Often, these
babies must have their elbows placed in splints, their hands wrapped in gauze,
and have all of their teeth extracted. 109 There is, as of now, no cure for LeschNyhan syndrome, but the condition’s genetics are well understood. 110 Instead of

the LGBT population is more susceptible to suicide may be offensive to some. See DALE CARPENTER,
FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS 34 (2012).
103. Angus Chen, For Centuries a Small Town Has Embraced Strangers with Mental Illness, NPR (July
1, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/07/01/484083305/for-centuries-a-smalltown-has-embraced-strangers-with-mental-illness [https://perma.cc/5Q9U-ZRRM].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Instead of viewing a boarder as an ill person—as an “other”—she is part of the spectrum of
“mental differences” that exist within humanity. Id.
107. Id.
108. Among these is Fragile X Syndrome, a likely target for CRISPR soon. See Foulkes et al., supra
note 2, at 1377; see also Jamie Berke, How Do Deaf People View Themselves?, VERY WELL HEALTH (Aug.
29,
2018),
https://www.verywellhealth.com/deaf-culture-deaf-disabled-both-1048590
[https://perma.cc/ER33-AFL4] (hashing out the debate as to whether deafness is or is not a disability)
. ADHD is also on this list. See, e.g., Chuck Ruby, ADHD Is Not a Disorder, INT’L SOC’Y ETHICAL
PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY (Feb. 9, 2016), http://psychintegrity.org/1377-2/ [https://perma.cc/
538Z=AE2T] (“‘ADHD’ is not a condition or disorder. It is a descriptive label given to people who are
not interested enough in a particular topic or an authority figure as they should be.”).
109. I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV.
423, 473 (2011) [Cohen, Regulating Reproduction].
110. Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome, NIH: GENETICS HOME REFERENCE (Feb. 3, 2013),
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/condition/lesch-nyhan-syndrome.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PE7-TTUZ].
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defining the right as Enríquez has in his argument—at monogenic conditions
to avoid the line-drawing problem—the line might be placed at conditions
involving cognitive deficiencies so that the child would be born with an
Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of no more than X or a life expectancy of no more
than Y. This definition avoids the problem the Roe framework struggled with,
which is that as the technology improved the lines drawn in Roe became
unworkable. 111 Monogenic conditions will never become polygenic, though
science may one day be able to target polygenic conditions using CRISPR. And
so, as in Roe, the lines Enríquez draws making access to CRISPR therapies
targeting monogenic conditions fundamental, but excluding polygenic
conditions because the science is not well understood, become unworkable.
Using IQ or life expectancy as a benchmark, however, poses no such problem. 112
Because moving to define the right more carefully resolves the
intractability problem, it is possible that the Court might reject the broad
definition of the right to GGE for not being adequately careful. 113 This
rejection, considering Glucksberg’s first prong, seems reasonable given the fact
that leaving open-ended the definition of burden, subject to change depending
on societal context, is antithetical to providing a “careful description of the
asserted right.” 114 If we move to more clearly define the right, then we have
solved the Glucksberg prong two problem while creating a Glucksberg prong one
problem. That is, there is no tradition deeply rooted in history for editing out
genes that cause a child to be born with an IQ of no more than X or a life
expectancy of no more than Y. And it makes little sense for the Court to accept
one definition of the right for the first prong, while analyzing Glucksberg’s
second prong using a different definition of the right. 115

Children diagnosed with Tay-Sachs don’t fare much better. Cohen, Regulating Reproduction, supra note
109, at 473.
111. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
112. Concededly, it may be that one day the life expectancy of children with Tay-Sachs may exceed
Y. But this is not a problem because then Tay-Sachs falls outside of the right, though the right remains
unchanged. Based on this standard, all children who had Tay-Sachs edited out of their genome would
have had a life expectancy of less than Y at the time of birth. There may still be some misgivings here,
as the edited child’s life expectancy may have increased past Y during his lifetime. Because we are
talking about germline genome editing here, Tay-Sachs will have also been edited out of that child’s
future children, who more likely would have had a life expectancy greater than Y. Those children,
however, would have otherwise never existed, so long as Y stays under reproductive age. In any case,
it’s not a perfect line—and there are more problems with it than those I’ve raised here—but it is a
better one.
113. See Ossareh, supra note 67, at 757.
114. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997); see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,
414 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting anything that would require the Court “to make the
extremely subjective and excessively discretionary determination . . . is sufficiently repugnant to the
notion of due process”).
115. This is, after all, exactly what the Court refused to do in Glucksberg. 521 U.S. at 702.
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2. Substantive Due Process and Value-Forming Characteristics
Let’s assume, as some have suggested, that the Court’s opinion in Lawrence
invites a more expansive fundamental rights analysis and that this more flexible
analysis allows us to bypass the Glucksberg problem outlined above. In other
words, that Lawrence spells the death of narrowly defined substantive due
process rights. 116 This conclusion is speculative, 117 given that Lawrence does not
ultimately recognize a fundamental right, makes use of the language in
Glucksberg, and concludes by submitting the Texas statute to rational basis
review. 118 Further, the Court in Gonzales v. Carhart 119—a substantive due
process case decided after Lawrence and with a majority opinion also authored
by Justice Kennedy—adhered to the standards articulated in Glucksberg without
mention of Lawrence. 120 Even assuming the conclusion that Lawrence spells the
end of narrowly defined rights is true, however, Lawrence itself then imposes a
different limitation.
As clarified by Lawrence, the concerns that underscore the Court’s
decisions on the right to privacy revolve around shielding value-transmitting
and value-forming relationships from the state’s control. 121 And it is these
concerns that are important for determining if a decision fits within a previously
recognized, broadly defined right. 122 That is, the level of generality that should
be used in a constitutional analysis depends on whether the abstraction is
representative of the actual tradition, as determined by whether the same
concerns as those underlaying the Court’s prior holdings are present. Should
those concerns not be the same, it’s more likely that the abstraction is nothing
more than a mere concoction presented for purposes of litigation. 123
Unlike having a German-speaking child or having one’s children attend
private schools, raising a disease-free child lacks the same traditional link to
value formation. Certainly, a mother might need her child to speak German so
116. See Nancy Pham, Note, Choice v. Chance, The Constitutional Case for Regulating Human Germline
Genetic Modification, 34 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 133, 139–40 (2006) (“Some argue that Lawrence
signals the death of the narrow approach to defining rights.”).
117. And taken to its logical extreme, it is also contrary to precedent. Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (“The doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the
utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.”).
118. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 558, 578 (2003).
119. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
120. Calabresi, supra note 84, at 1518 (“I think the overwhelming majority of future substantive
due process cases are going to be decided, as Gonzales was, with citation to Glucksberg and without
reference to Lawrence.”). In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
of 2003. 550 U.S. at 124.
121. See Tribe, supra note 10, at 189. And if Lawrence spells the death of narrowly defined
constitutional rights, then the Court’s cases from Meyer to Lawrence have to be understood as part of a
single tradition, speaking to one broad fundamental right.
122. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 110 (1991).
123. See id. at 111 (“[T]he test should be whether the asserted level of generality provides an
appropriate description of already-protected rights without reference to the newly-asserted rights.”).
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that she can communicate with him and pass down cultural values and
traditions. This may be the only way for her to fulfill a part of her development
as a person. Through the relationship with her German-speaking child, she
will—by virtue of the shared language—now be able to transmit her values and
share in his experience. Likewise, a mother might want her child to attend
private religious school because the child will pick up on certain values. These
values are important to her as an individual and contribute to the formation of
the value-transmitting parent-child relationship so central to the parent’s
development. But, at least traditionally, there doesn’t exist a role for a diseasefree condition to contribute to the preservation of the value-transmitting
relationship between parent and child.
To the contrary, it has been suggested that engaging in GGE helps to
deface the parent-child relationship. And as such, by recognizing constitutional
protections for the decision to engage in GGE, the Court would not only fail
to protect the value-forming and value-transmitting parent-child relationship
but instead contribute to corrupting the ideal of parenthood. 124 The use of these
technologies makes procreation more akin to manufacturing, where the
“manufacturer stands above [the product],” resulting in a process which is
“profoundly dehumanizing, no matter how good the product.” 125 If by finding
that the right to privacy encompasses the right of a parent to use GGE
technologies the Court would arguably be sanctioning the disfiguring of a
relationship it had previously been concerned with protecting, we can assume
the abstraction of the right to privacy in this case would not be representative
of actual traditions.
B.

Limitations from Decisions Restricting Parental Autonomy

To be sure, the Court could take a broader view of the intrinsic concerns
in Lawrence. Arguably, if the concerns underlying Lawrence were about keeping
the state from interfering with value-forming and value-transmitting
relationships, then the state should be kept out of all central decisions involving
parental autonomy. Because generally, no matter what decisions the parent is
making for her child, the relationship itself is a value-forming and valuetransmitting one by definition. The actual values being transmitted are, to all
intents and purposes, irrelevant. Even so, the Court—any limitations imposed

124. See Cohen, Best Interest supra note 63, at 1270 (“[Genetic modification] disfigures the relation
between parent and child . . . .”) (quoting MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION
46 (2007)).
125. Id. at 1265 (quoting Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, in THE ETHICS OF HUMAN
CLONING 3, 39 (1998)).
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by Lawrence and Glucksberg aside—has explicitly recognized that a parent’s
constitutionally protected interests are not so expansive. 126
The Court has previously struck down a parent’s authority over her minor
child’s abortion decisions, 127 instructing that the familial relationship between
parent and child is not beyond the state’s regulatory reach. 128 Again, in Parham
v. J.R., 129 despite siding with the parents, the Court noted that in certain
circumstances a parent is not free to have “absolute and unreviewable
discretion” to make medical decisions for her child. 130 In Prince v.
Massachusetts, 131 the Court affirmed the conviction of a child’s legal guardian for
violating a child labor law, holding that the state has broad authority over
children’s activities and may lawfully restrict the parent’s control. 132 As these
cases illustrate, in decisions involving parental autonomy following Meyer and
Pierce, the Court has not always been absolutely deferential to the parent. To
determine when Meyer and Pierce—two load-bearing pillars of modern
substantive due process—do support a claim for parental autonomy, the Court
looks to how the allocation of decisionmaking power in the context at hand
serves the parent, the child, and values central to the Constitution. 133
Indeed, it makes sense to rest the recognition of the right in parental
autonomy cases on how the allocation of decisionmaking power affects those
involved: although protections afforded to parental autonomy have deep roots
in tradition, they are nonetheless unusual constitutional protections. They
involve protecting one person’s control over another person—the parent’s
control over the child. 134 Even if the reasons for shielding parental autonomy
from government interference are characterized as parent-centric, we can’t
negate the fact that the parental decisions implicate control over a third party
in the name of autonomy. Because of this idiosyncrasy, 135 when the Court grants
constitutional protection to a parent’s decisions involving her child, special
attention is paid to three distinct interests typically served by protecting
parental autonomy: (1) the parent’s interest in achieving fulfillment through
126. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973) (“[T]he right has some extension to activities relating
to marriage, . . . procreation, . . . contraception, . . . family relationships . . . , and child rearing and
education.” (emphasis added)) .
127. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 426 (1983).
128. See Attanasio, supra note 1, at 1295.
129. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
130. Id. at 604.
131. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
132. Id. at 166–67, 168, 170.
133. Developments in the Law—The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1353 (1980).
134. Id. at 1352–53.
135. See Andrew J. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State (pt.
2), 4 FAM. L.Q. 409, 410–11 (1970); see also Developments in the Law, supra note 133, at 1353 (“If the
scope of . . . a constitutional right is to be defined in a coherent fashion, special attention must be paid
to the interests it serves.”).
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childrearing; (2) the child’s interest in having the decisionmaker be the one best
suited to the task; and (3) the Constitution’s interest in diversity and
pluralism. 136 To determine the degree of protection that should be afforded to
a certain parental right, 137 a determination must be made about the extent to
which each of these interests is served. 138
1. The Parent’s Interest in Self-Fulfillment
The argument for GGE above lays out the significance of the parent’s
interest in self-fulfillment under the circumstances. 139 In any case, the interests
of the parent will always pull in favor of parental autonomy. Though the degree
of control being afforded to the parent in this case is drastic—at issue is the
(likely) irreversible manipulation of her child’s genetic code, the essence of his
being. 140 So the correlating degree of constitutional protection required will
necessarily turn on how the interests of others involved are implicated. 141
2. The Child’s Interest in the Allocation of the Decision
A child has an interest in having the best-situated decisionmaker call the
shots. 142 At least for a subset of children in the GGE context, the Nonidentity
Problem will always align the child’s interests with those of the parent. The
Nonidentity Problem tells us that no matter how strongly, ex ante, the child’s
interest in having the best decisionmaker available to him militates against
unrestricted parental autonomy, the edited child’s alternative—ex post, once he
is in a position to assert his interests—is to never have existed at all. Where the
GGE intervention was a necessary condition for the child’s existence, and where
the child is not destined to live a life not worth living, the child’s interest will
always favor the parent as the best-suited decisionmaker. 143 As it turns out,
however, the effects of the Nonidentity Problem are more nuanced and affect
only a subset of relevant scenarios.

136. See Developments in the Law, supra note 133, at 1353.
137. See Kleinfeld, supra note 135, at 412.
138. Developments in the Law, supra note 133, at 1354.
139. See supra Section III.A.2.b (outlining how a parent-child relationship is central to a parent’s
development of self). But see supra Section II.A.2 (arguing that a disease-free child does not contribute
to a parent’s development of self as traditionally understood).
140. See I. Glenn Cohen, What (If Anything) Is Wrong with Human Enhancement: What (If Anything)
Is Right with It?, 49 TULSA L. REV. 645, 647 (2014).
141. Developments in the Law, supra note 133, at 1354.
142. Id. at 1353.
143. See supra Section III.A.2.b.i (exploring the how the parent’s interests will always favor staving
off government intervention).
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Existing Embryos and False Nonidentity Problems

A true Nonidentity Problem arises only when the edited child would
otherwise not have existed. 144 In a majority of scenarios, however, the
Nonidentity Problem isn’t decisive when it comes to the child’s interest. Where
the edited embryo would have been conceived in any case, a true Nonidentity
Problem does not arise. In this scenario, the parent is informed that, without
GGE intervention, her already conceived child will suffer from condition Q.
Although Q may be a serious medical condition, Q is nonetheless compatible
with life. But GGE could prevent condition Q from developing in the parent’s
embryo. 145 Under a traditional understanding of the Nonidentity Problem,
whether or not GGE intervention takes place, the identity of the child with
condition Q remains constant. 146 The same is true if the child has not been
conceived, but the availability of GGE interventions would have in no way
influenced the parent’s decision to conceive. For purposes of the Nonidentity
Problem’s framework, the child’s identity is the same pre- and postintervention. And so, the child asserting his rights ex post is the same child
whose interests, ex ante, opposed unrestricted parental autonomy. The child’s
counterfactual here is to exist as himself with condition Q. The Nonidentity
Problem, therefore, isn’t an obstacle to considering how parental autonomy
serves at least some children’s interests in having the best-situated
decisionmaker make the GGE decision.
b.

Roe and Fetal Rights

But any maneuvering past the Nonidentity Problem drives the argument
directly into the fetal rights obstacle embedded in Roe. The Supreme Court has
explicitly rejected the proposition that an embryo should be considered
human—a person under the Constitution—at conception. 147 There is no dispute
that the Court in Roe rhetorically denied fetal rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 148 The embryo to be edited exists at an even earlier developmental
stage than the fetus in Roe. Although, unlike the fetus at issue in Roe—which
will exist no more after the abortion is performed—the embryo at issue here
will develop into a person as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment. And that

144. In this case, this is a very narrow category encompassing children that would have never been
conceived or would have been aborted but for the parent’s choice to use GGE.
145. Eduardo Rivera-López, Individual Procreative Responsibility and the Non-Identity Problem, 90
PAC. PHIL. Q. 336, 338 (2009) (citing Derek Parfit, Future Generations: Further Problems, 11 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 113, 113–72 (1981)).
146. Id. The same can be said of children who would have been aborted but for the availability of
GGE intervention.
147. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
148. See Attanasio, supra note 1, at 1294 n.107 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 158–59).
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person will have to move about the world with the GGE decision having “a real
and lasting effect on his life.” 149
It is important to remember that in the context of parental autonomy
decisions, the Court is concerned with a narrow interest: the child’s interest in
having the best-situated decisionmaker making decisions. 150 The issue is not
that, to curtail parental autonomy, the fetus’s liberty interests must outweigh
those of the parent. Rather, the parent’s liberty interests have usually been
protected only where the protection would serve to further the child’s interest
in having a most capable decisionmaker advocate for him. The dicta in Roe must
be overcome to the extent that it would prohibit the Court from considering
the interests of the future child at all.
Here, there is strong indication that the child’s interests would support
limiting parental autonomy. 151 The parent’s particular familiarity with her child
has little relevance in a medical context. 152 Medical expertise will better situate
a decisionmaker than the special relationship between parent and child. 153 By
virtue of being born a genetically engineered human, the child will also be
irreversibly branded as an “other,” potentially compromising that child’s
essential human dignity. 154 The parent, however, in making the GGE decision
is likely avoiding branding herself as an “other,” the parent of a “diseased” child.
As such, there exists an inherent conflict between parent and child in the GGE
decision. At best, the parent, having no medical expertise, is no better situated
than the state to make the GGE choice. At worst, the parent is a conflicted
decision-maker, unlikely to further the interests of her child. Therefore, in the
category of cases where the Nonidentity Problem is not at issue, the child’s
interests do not favor unrestricted parental autonomy.
3. The Constitution’s Stake in Diversity and Pluralism
One final consideration is that where the Court has thwarted government
intrusion into decisions central to parental autonomy, the parent’s autonomy
has clearly helped to further the Constitution’s interest in safeguarding
diversity and pluralism. 155 Unrestricted parental autonomy, by splintering
149. Id. at 1294 n.108 (citing Patricia A. King, The Judicial Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal
Protection of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1672–73 (1979)).
150. Developments in the Law, supra note 133, at 1354.
151. Id. at 1355 (explaining that in the context of medical treatment “the interest of the child
typically does not favor parental control”).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Attanasio, supra note 1, at 1296 (“Any possibility of living as a non-Genos person is lost:
daily existence may be punctuated by jealousy, ridicule, and exclusion. Essential human dignity may
also be compromised by the realization that one is the product of genetic fabrication.”).
155. See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
401–02 (1923); Developments in the Law, supra note 133, at 1353; Michael G. Starr, Note, The Mental
Hospitalization of Children and the Limits of Parental Authority, 88 YALE L.J. 186, 195 (1978).
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childrearing decisions, helps prevent state-imposed orthodoxy, which the
Constitution disfavors. 156 In the medical context, scholars have noted that where
the child’s interests do not favor unrestrained parental control, neither does the
societal interest in diversity and pluralism. 157 Government regulations of GGE
technologies are unlike state-imposed restrictions on teaching foreign languages
in that the former arguably prevents the standardization of children while the
latter sanctions state-imposed orthodoxy.
CRISPR’s scientific underpinnings are antithetical to an interest in
diversity. Through the Human Genome Project, scientists developed for their
use the equivalent of a standardized reference text. 158 Following the mapping of
the human genetic terrain, genome sequencing was then used to identify
defective genes and correct genetic mistakes. 159 This view of genetic differences
as a textual error—deviations as a marker of a “genetic other”—reinforces a
negative construction of disabilities and undervalues genetic diversity. 160 The
reference text developed through the Human Genome Project, after all, is
anything but diverse: it was derived from samples of a few men of European
origin. 161 One of the most poignant critiques of research in genomics, moreover,
is that the sample population from which data is collected to conduct clinical
trials and Genome-Wide Association Studies lacks diversity. 162 In short, the
data being collected comes mostly from white, non-Hispanic participants, and
new technologies and treatments are developed based on this unrepresentative
sample. 163 Any corrections made through GGE to edit out genetic abnormalities
would therefore, in effect, be standardizing to a nondiverse mean.
By using CRISPR to eliminate deviations from the unrepresentative
reference text based on unrepresentative data, GGE is—at least to some
extent—targeting diversity as genetic disease. Of course, genetic diversity is not
exactly what comes to mind with mention of a pluralist society’s interest in
diversity. But if we simply consider that some diversity of thought comes from
diversity of experience, and that diversity of experience ultimately stems, at
least in part, from biological diversity, genetic diversity and diversity of thought
156. Starr, supra note 155, at 195.
157. Developments in the Law, supra note 133, at 1356.
158. James C. Wilson, (Re)Writing the Genetic Body-Text: Disability, Textuality, and the Human
Genome Project, CULTURAL CRITIQUE, Winter 2002, at 23, 26.
159. Id. at 25.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 26.
162. See Winnie W.S. Mak et al., Gender and Ethnic Diversity in NIMH-Funded Clinical Trials:
Review of a Decade of Published Research, 34 ADMIN. & POL’Y MENTAL HEALTH & MENTAL HEALTH
SERVS. RES. 497, 497 (2007).
163. See Roseann E. Peterson et al., Genome-Wide Association Studies in Ancestrally Diverse
Populations: Opportunities, Methods, Pitfalls, and Recommendations, 179 CELL, 589, 598 (2019); see also
Clara C. Hildebrand & Jonathan M. Marron, Justice in CRISPR/Cas9 Research and Clinical Applications,
20 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 826, 826–27 (2018).
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are inextricably linked. Certainly, there may be cases, as illustrated by the
achondroplasia vignette above, where a parent would be applying GGE to select
for diversity. In this context, it is enough to show that the Constitution’s
interest in diversity and pluralism is not clearly served by allocating the
decisionmaking to the parent alone. The diversity-based CRISPR critiques are
enough to introduce some uncertainty.
At minimum, the interests of the Constitution in diversity and pluralism
are conceivably at risk of being disserved in the context of GGE. 164
Additionally, for at least a subset of circumstances, the child’s relevant interests
are in no way served. As it has in cases past, this balance of interests should
dissuade the Court from extending an unusual constitutional protection, a
protection which affords one person control over another, to the GGE context.
Limitations derived from Glucksberg, Lawrence, and other precedents
counsel against recognizing a fundamental right to therapeutic GGE.
Independently, prudential concerns offer more reasons for doing the same.
III. PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS
More than any other justiciability doctrine, the judiciary’s self-imposed
restraint requiring judicially manageable standards explicitly recognizes the gap
between constitutional guarantees and judicially enforceable rights. 165
A.

Intractable Line-Drawing and the Parents’ Parallel Rights

So far, both the argument and the counterargument for GGE have
discussed the right of a parent in the singular. But any one embryo would
necessarily have two (maybe even three) parents. 166 If a mother has a
fundamental right to edit out a certain genetic profile in her embryo, it seems
necessary to recognize a parallel right in the embryo’s other genetic parent(s)
to keep the embryo’s genetic makeup intact, or vice versa. 167 The parents’ rights
would come to a point of intersection. And at their intersection, at minimum,
the rights of all parents are no longer judicially manageable. 168 Professor
Laurence Tribe has addressed this issue in the context of embryo destruction,
concluding there is no principled way for the Court to choose between the rights

164. See supra notes 106–11 and accompanying text.
165. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 125, 1276 (2006).
166. J. Ravindra Fernando, Note, Three’s Company: A Constitutional Analysis of Prohibiting Access to
Three-Parent in Vitro Fertilization, 29 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 523, 523—524 (2015).
167. See Tribe, supra note 10, 182 n.135.
168. Id. In every internally consistent logical system, a proposition P whose truth would imply
both X and non-X cannot be true. See James Aspnes, Notes on Mathematical Logic, YALE: ASPNES
PINEWIKI (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.cs.yale.edu/homes/aspnes/pinewiki/MathematicalLogic.html
[https://perma.cc/59YE-NPJ5].
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of two similarly-situated parents. 169 In other words, the Court would have a
hard time fashioning a reliable standard for determining which parent’s
constitutional rights should be protected at the expense of the other, similarly
situated parents’.
B.

Institutional (In)competence & Science

The Court’s lack of expertise and expressed hesitance in involving itself in
issues of science and technology are worth emphasizing. As Enríquez himself
aptly points out, there is no available framework, as of now, for satisfactorily
addressing questions of science in law. 170 The Court recognizes the challenges
that complex scientific principles pose to legal scholars. Take for example the
oral arguments for the Myriad Genetics case. Myriad involved complex questions
about genetics and molecular biology. 171 The Justices were exceedingly
confused 172 on important points. Beyond not understanding the science, Justice
Scalia candidly admitted that he did not believe in facts that have been readily
accepted by the scientific community for decades. 173 And, in a frighteningly
relevant context, there’s precedent for the Court making misguided decisions
where the underpinning science at issue was not well understood by the Justices:
Buck v. Bell. 174 During the time Buck was decided, the eugenics movement,
seeking to eradicate the feebleminded and other genetically inferior people from
the American population, had gained huge momentum in the United States. 175
Among eugenics supporters was Oliver Wendell Holmes. 176 Justice Holmes,
writing for the majority, concluded by upholding a sterilization statute with the
unfortunate remark: “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough.” 177 Buck v.
Bell has never been overruled. 178
As a matter of policy, the Court should refrain from basing decisions on
scientific issues the institution isn’t competent to handle.

169. See Tribe, supra note 10, 182 n.135.
170. Paul Enríquez, Genome Editing and the Jurisprudence of Scientific Empiricism, 19 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 603, 603, 610–11 (2017).
171. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 576 (2013).
172. See generally Oral Argument, Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (No. 12-398),
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-398-amc7.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LNQ2-A7JJ] (showcasing the Justices’ struggle to understand the science behind the
patents for DNA sequences).
173. See Enríquez, supra note 170, at 609 (quoting Justice Scalia in Myriad).
174. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
175. See generally ADAM COHEN, IMBECILES: THE SUPREME COURT, AMERICAN EUGENICS,
AND THE STERILIZATION OF CARRIE BUCK 25 (2016) [hereinafter COHEN, IMBECILES].
176. Id. at 241–43.
177. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
178. See COHEN, IMBECILES supra note 175, at 12.
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CONCLUSION
GGE applications are no longer improbable hypotheticals. Genetically
modified humans are, after all, now among us. 179 When the decision to recognize
a fundamental right to access GGE technology reaches the Supreme Court, the
Court should adhere to its precedent in a delicate area, where “[g]uideposts for
responsible decisionmaking . . . are scarce and open-ended . . . . [And t]he
doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires [the Court] to exercise the utmost care
whenever [it is] asked to break new ground.” 180 As such, the Court should refuse
to recognize a fundamental right to GGE for health and therapeutic uses.

179. See Cyranoski & Reardon, supra note 3.
180. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992).

